Hastings Law Journal
Volume 64 | Issue 6

Article 6

8-2013

The Return of Results in Genetic Testing: Who
Owes What to Whom, When, and Why?
Stephanie A. Alessi

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stephanie A. Alessi, The Return of Results in Genetic Testing: Who Owes What to Whom, When, and Why?, 64 Hastings L.J. 1697
(2013).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol64/iss6/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Alessi_64-HLJ-1697 (Do Not Delete)

9/25/2013 12:43 PM

The Return of Results in Genetic Testing:
Who Owes What to Whom, When, and Why?
Stephanie A. Alessi*
The field of genetic research has revolutionized modern medicine and will continue to
do so in the years to come. For the people whose biological materials form the basis for
this research, however, the research process may also lead to personal discoveries—
namely, it may expose information about their health, genetic predispositions, and
other gene-linked characteristics. Researchers who uncover this kind of personal
genetic information are likewise confronted with the question of whether they should—
or must—provide their subjects with feedback about their results.
For subjects and researchers alike, the answer is unclear. Presently, there is little
guidance as to these parties’ rights and responsibilities when it comes to the return of
genetic results in a research setting. As a result, neither party has a clearly defined
understanding of what to expect from the research relationship. This Article draws on
recognized ethical and legal foundations to propose that genetic researchers should
owe three limited legal duties to their research subjects regarding planning for,
acquiring informed consent about, and reporting certain genetic findings. Considering
the wide variation among individuals in terms of what genetic information they would
like to know, this Article balances concerns for individual autonomy with the right to
acquire personal health information, and it weighs those interests against the potential
cost to socially beneficial genetic research. In balancing these considerations, this
Article’s proposals for a limited set of duties offer a careful step toward clearly defining
the rights and responsibilities of genetic researchers and their subjects.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of Law, 2013; B.A., Stanford University, 2009.
Many thanks to Professor Jaime King, whose support and guidance have been invaluable in writing
this Article and throughout law school. Thanks also to Dane, Ben, Margot, and the rest of the Hastings
Law Journal staff for the many hours they have dedicated to making this Volume a success.
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Introduction
With the advent of large-scale genetic research, discoveries about
the human race that never before seemed possible are becoming a
reality. Potentially lifesaving and life-changing concepts that were once
elements of science fiction, such as the emerging fields of personalized
1
medicine and pharmacogenomics, are now within reach. To support
these scientific discoveries, biobanks catalog library-sized collections of
DNA samples and offer researchers access to an increasingly diverse
2
supply of genetic material to use in their research. These stored samples
provide the means for studies that will eventually uncover benefits about
which we can now only speculate.
Despite the enormous potential of genetic research, the research
process itself has potentially troublesome implications for the human
subjects who contribute their genetic materials. Chief among these
concerns is the question of what to do with the individual data that arise as
a result of genetic research. Genetic material may reveal features of a
1. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins et al., A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research, 422 Nature
835, 843 (2003).
2. See Mark Stranger & Jane Kaye, Governing Biobanks: An Introduction, in Principles and
Practice in Biobank Governance 1, 2 (Jane Kaye & Mark Stranger eds., 2009).
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person that she was not even aware existed because a gene typically only
becomes visible when it impacts the observable characteristic in one’s
phenotypic profile. Nonetheless, this genetic information may provide
useful insight into one’s health status that, if available, many individuals
3
would want to know.
Placing a responsibility on researchers to provide subjects with all
theoretically interesting or useful information, however, can detract time
and resources from a study’s primary purpose. As such, researchers are
often forced to balance the subjects’ personal interests against their
research goals. Yet there exist no uniform standards on which either
researchers or subjects may rely as they perform this balancing act.
Although researchers are guided by the broad command that, “no matter
how important the research questions, it is not ethical to use human
4
participants without appropriate protections,” they have little guidance
to help determine what constitute appropriate protections when they
must decide whether to return genetic research results. Participants also
5
lack clear guidance as to what information they are entitled to receive.
Both parties are thus left with the unanswered question: To what extent
is there an ethical obligation, and to what extent should there be a legal
duty, to return results to a research subject?
When considering this question, it is crucial to remember that there
is wide variation in individuals’ expectations about their participation in
6
genetic research. One example that underscores the importance of

3. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Fullerton et al., Return of Individual Research Results from GenomeWide Association Studies: Experience of the Electronic Medical Records and Genomics (eMERGE)
Network, 14 Genetics Med. 424, 425 (2012) (“The rationale for returning such findings is to provide
patients with the opportunity for appropriate medical management.”).
4. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 851 (Md. 2001) (quoting Nat’l
Bioethics Advisory Comm’n, Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human
Participants 2–3 (2000) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5. The line between genetic research and clinical care can often be blurry to research subjects
and their families; therefore, simply because information is gathered for research purposes does not
relieve researchers of the ethical responsibility to warn them of any negative findings. See D. Pullman
& K. Hodgkinson, Genetic Knowledge and Moral Responsibility: Ambiguity at the Interface of Genetic
Research and Clinical Practice, 69 Clinical Genetics 199, 199–200 (2006); see also infra Part II.D.
6. See, e.g., Ellen Wright Clayton, Incidental Findings in Genetic Research Using Archived DNA,
36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 286, 289 (2008). For example, one particularly complex allele that is associated
with heightened cardiovascular risk is also associated with Alzheimer’s disease. Id. While an individual
may want to undergo genetic testing to understand her risk of developing heart disease, she may
prefer not to know one way or another about her risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease. Id.; see also
J.S. Roberts et al., Using Alzheimer’s Disease as a Model for Genetic Risk Disclosure: Implications for
Personal Genomics, 80 Clinical Genetics 407 (2011) (examining participants’ psychological and
behavioral responses to learning about their genetic risks of developing Alzheimer’s disease). The
National Human Genome Research Institute recently awarded $5.7 million in grants for more datadriven studies of subjects’ reactions to finding out results of genetic research. NHGRI Funds Return of
Results Studies, Forms Expert Consortium, Johns Hopkins Berman Inst. of Bioethics
Announcements (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.bioethicsbulletin.org/archive/nhgri-funds-return-ofresults-studies-forms-expert-consortium. Ultimately, that funding is designed to help the scientific and
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understanding that variation is the story of the Havasupai Tribe.
Members of this isolated southwestern Native American tribe submitted
blood samples to a genetic researcher for a study on diabetes, but
unbeknownst to the tribe members, their blood samples were saved and
8
used in subsequent studies to which they had not intended to consent.
These studies uncovered stigmatizing information about the rate of
schizophrenia in tribe members and genetic evidence of their evolutionary
migration patterns that contradicted the religious folklore about their
9
spiritual origins. Although the researchers, who viewed these studies as
socially beneficial, had assumed the tribe members would have no
concern about the use of their donated DNA samples for additional
research topics beyond diabetes, the tribe members felt it was a
fundamental violation of their rights to use their DNA to study topics to
10
which they had not initially agreed.
The case of the Havasupai Tribe illustrates that a subject’s
autonomy interests do not necessarily align with a researcher’s goals.
Likewise, for a variety of reasons—spiritual, cultural, personal, or
otherwise—individuals may simply not want to know the results that
11
researchers discover about them. The Havasupai case highlights the
need to maintain secure protections to ensure that every participant in
every study gives appropriate informed consent and is able to opt out of
both participating in future studies and receiving any results. Whether or
not a researcher agrees with an individual’s decision to forego learning
about her genetic future, the research design and governance must allow
individuals to make such decisions as they see fit.

legal communities better understand what participants expect when they provide genetic material and
thereby help develop a set of best practices with regard to the practical and ethical implications of
returning genetic research results. Id.
7. See generally Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
8. Id. at 1067.
9. Id.
10. Id. Eventually, Arizona State University “agreed to pay $700,000 to 41 of the tribe’s members,
return the blood samples and provide other forms of assistance to the impoverished Havasupai—a
settlement that legal experts said was significant because it implied that the rights of research subjects
can be violated when they are not fully informed about how their DNA might be used.” Amy
Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit Research of Its DNA, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html.
11. See, e.g., Barbara Bowles Biesecker et al., Psychosocial Factors Predicting BRCA1/BRCA2
Testing Decisions in Members of Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer Families, 93 Am. J. Med.
Genetics 257, 257 (2000) (analyzing the factors influencing the testing decisions of individuals with
family histories of breast and ovarian cancer and finding that those who were younger, had optimistic
personalities, and belonged to cohesive families were most likely to undergo genetic testing);
Kimberley A. Quaid & Michael Morris, Reluctance to Undergo Predictive Testing: The Case of
Huntington Disease, 45 Am. J. Med. Genetics 41, 43 (1993) (finding that some individuals who are at
risk for Huntington’s disease choose not to undergo predictive testing because of the lack of a cure for
the disease, the potential impact on health insurance, the fear of putting their children at risk, and the
personal impact of knowing about their impending disease).
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Similarly, when developing governance schemes for genetic research,
protecting the confidentiality of participants’ information must also be a
priority. With the threat—or at least the fear of the threat—of genetic
12
discrimination in employment and in the insurance industry, many
individuals feel a strong incentive to keep their genetic information
private. Any guidelines on this issue must also take account of and protect
these privacy interests.
This Article balances three competing goals—promoting socially
beneficial genetic research, protecting individual health and access to
personal information, and preserving individual autonomy and privacy—
and proposes the adoption of specific, limited duties regarding planning
for, acquiring informed consent about, and reporting genetic results.
These duties must be uniformly and narrowly drawn so as to neither
impede scientific progress nor interfere with individuals’ rights to their
personal autonomy and privacy, but they must also be broad enough to
ensure research participants appropriate access to their personal health
information. As more people undergo genetic testing, and as the scientific
community clarifies more genotype-phenotype links, it will become
increasingly common for investigators to uncover genetic findings that
13
have potentially important implications. As such, there is an increasing
need to establish a coherent and consistent way to deal with these
findings.
This Article attempts to develop a comprehensive set of guidelines
on which researchers and participants can steadfastly rely. Part I
describes the different contexts in which genetic results can arise and
discusses the unique infrastructures in which genetic researchers operate.
Parts II and III explore the possible sources of ethical and legal duties as
they apply to sharing research results with subjects. Finally, Part IV
proposes three specific recommendations of legal duties that researchers
should owe to their subjects, taking into consideration the infrastructure
and logistics, ethical implications, and legal doctrines relating to genetic
research.

12. See, e.g., Karen H. Rothenberg & Sharon F. Terry, Before It’s Too Late—Addressing Fear of
Genetic Information, 297 Science 196, 196–97 (2002) (“It is only reasonable to be concerned that
health insurers and employers may not fully understand the implications and limitations of genetic test
results and the complex relationships between genotype and phenotype. . . . [O]nce genetic
information enters databases, it will be extremely hard to remove it or prevent disclosure. When the
public appreciates the extent of use of genetic information for nonmedical purposes, it will only
further exacerbate fear of discrimination and loss of privacy.”); cf. Pullman & Hodgkinson, supra note
5, at 202 (“[G]enetic privacy is a somewhat fickle matter, dependent to a large extent on the
phenotypic expression of the particular genetic condition. . . . Concerns about insurability can also be
misleading, as knowledge of serious genetic disease in the family has to be disclosed, regardless of
individual disease status.”).
13. See Isaac S. Kohane et al., Reestablishing the Researcher-Patient Compact, 316 Science 836,
836 (2007).
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I. The Context
In order to know what society can and should demand of researchers,
it is crucial to understand the framework in which they operate. Genetic
research can produce results in several different contexts, each of which
has unique features that determine what kind of relationship the
researcher has with her subjects and what procedures for delivering those
results are feasible. It is thus necessary to consider how different types of
results might arise within different settings before prescribing across-theboard legal duties. This Part explores three specific points during a study
at which researchers should be prepared to address the possibility of
finding such results: the institutional review board’s evaluation of the
study, the potential discovery of incidental findings, and the use of
biobanking to store samples.
A. Institutional Review Board Oversight
The most straightforward way that genetic results may arise is as a
product of a study in which the participant knowingly takes part and to
which she directly consents. If a study tests for specific genetic links, the
research protocol can address which of those results will be shared with
the participant and to what extent. Institutional review board (“IRB”)
oversight standardizes this process. IRBs are formal committees that
14
review and approve research protocols concerning human subjects.
They determine whether a proposed study design meets federal
standards and is therefore eligible for federal funding and regulatory
15
approval. “An IRB’s primary role is to assure the safety of human
16
research subjects,” which means that during the review process the IRB
is responsible for addressing any problems with the protocol and
ensuring that, before participants contribute any biological materials,
17
they are fully aware of what results they will and will not receive.
Knowing what types of results the researchers will produce allows IRBs a
full opportunity to consider the financial, physical, and psychological

14. Lori B. Andrews et al., Genetics: Ethics, Law and Policy 94 (3d ed. 2010). The
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) requires that any institution seeking federal
funding for research on human subjects have an IRB review its protocols in accordance with HHS
policy. Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.122 (2009). To
qualify under the regulation, the IRB must have at least five members who are sufficiently qualified
and both personally and professionally diverse, including at least one member who is not otherwise
affiliated with the institution. Id. § 46.107.
15. Henry T. Greely, The Control of Genetic Research: Involving the “Groups Between”, 33 Hous.
L. Rev. 1397, 1401 n.8 (1997).
16. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 814 (Md. 2001).
17. See id. at 813 (“Generally, their primary functions are to assess the protocols of the project to
determine whether the project itself is appropriate, whether the consent procedures are adequate,
whether the methods to be employed meet proper standards, whether reporting requirements are
sufficient, and the assessment of various other aspects of a research project.”).
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burdens of returning results to participants, including concerns about
18
both false positive and false negative reports.
In recognition of the potentially serious implications of returning
genetic results, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office
for Human Research Protections has issued a guidebook that requires
IRBs to make sure that research protocols minimize harm by providing
for genetic counseling any time a researcher delivers genetic
19
information. This requirement reflects the judgment that merely
disclosing findings may not sufficiently ensure that an individual
20
completely understands the implications of a genetic diagnosis.
Researchers, after all, are often not medically trained and therefore may
21
not be skilled in effectively communicating serious clinical information.
By contrast, genetic counselors are specifically trained to interpret
genetic and medical information and to convey that information to
patients in a way that helps them understand and respond to genetic
22
risks. During review, the IRB can ensure that the study protocol has a
plan in place to refer participants for genetic counseling that is tailored to
the kind of information the investigators foresee finding in the course of
the study.
Despite this requirement, however, current IRB regulations do not
thoroughly reflect the present state of genetic technology. The regulations
leave too much room for variation in how researchers decide which results
23
to return. If researchers’ and participants’ expectations about studies
are to be nationally uniform, there must be additional standards to
specify how these issues should be addressed so as to promote the
24
development of widespread reliance on, and trust in, genetic research.
B. Incidental Findings
Planning for results becomes increasingly difficult when the results
cannot be predicted, as is the case with incidental findings. An incidental
finding is “a finding concerning an individual research participant that
has potential health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the

18. Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research:
Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 361, 366–67 (2008).
19. Id. at 367; see IRB Guidebook, Office for Human Research Protections (2003), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_guidebook.htm (overseeing the rights and wellbeing of human
subjects in HHS-supported research).
20. Moira A. Keane, Institutional Review Board Approaches to the Incidental Findings Problem,
36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 352, 355 (2008).
21. Id. at 354.
22. FAQs About Genetic Counselors and the NSGC, Nat’l Soc’y of Genetic Counselors,
http://www.nsgc.org/About/FAQsaboutGeneticCounselorsandtheNSGC/tabid/143/Default.aspx
(last
visited July 30, 2013).
23. Keane, supra note 20, at 352–53.
24. See id.
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course of conducting research but is beyond the aims of the study.” For
example, testing a multi-functional gene for its role in one disease might
26
indicate unexpected results about a different disease or condition.
Similarly, a study of the genetic aspects of a certain disease might
inadvertently reveal that a nearby gene—not included in the study but
close enough that the researcher might notice—has a potentially
27
dangerous mutation. Incidental findings occur frequently, and as routine
whole genome sequencing becomes increasingly common, the potential
28
to find incidental results will only continue to grow.
Incidental findings in the genetic context can range in severity,
including anything from a serious health problem to a misattribution of
29
paternity. Because different types of findings will have different physical,
psychological, and sociological implications, standardizing treatment of
30
these findings is challenging. Therefore, the factors that researchers use
to decide which incidental findings to return must be able to account for
these variations.
There is no current consensus, however, as to what those factors are,
which makes it difficult for both the researchers and the reviewing IRBs
31
to address the problem of incidental findings in their research protocols.
Furthermore, IRBs must consider whether some results might cause
more harm than benefit to the subject if they are disclosed. For instance,

25. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and
Recommendations, 36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 219, 219 (2008).
26. Clayton, supra note 6, at 289.
27. Id. at 288.
28. Mildred K. Cho, Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics,
36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 280, 281 (2008); Ma’n H. Zawati & Amélie Rioux, Biobanks and the Return of
Research Results: Out with the Old and In with the New?, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 614, 616 (2011). Cho
cites improvements in genetic research data and its availability to a wide range of researchers, as well
as the increasingly clear links between genetics and medicine, as some of the primary factors behind
this growth. Cho, supra, at 281.
29. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 362 (“Genetic family studies are estimated to reveal
misattributed paternity in about 10 percent of research participants in the general population.”); see
Clayton, supra note 6, at 288 (“By far the most common incidental finding in genetics is misattributed
paternity, which is typically estimated to occur in 1–10 percent of pregnancies.”).
30. Clayton, supra note 6, at 290.
31. Keane, supra note 20, at 353; Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 362. Recently, the American
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics released a report recommending how to approach
incidental findings in the context of clinical genome sequencing. Robert C. Green et al., Am. Coll.
of Med. Genetics & Genomics, ACMG Recommendation for Reporting of Incidental Findings in
Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing (2013). The report specifies a list of serious gene-linked
diseases for which “prevalence may be high and intervention may be possible” and states that, for
findings related to these particular conditions, the duty to warn patients “supersedes concerns about
autonomy.” Id. at 11. In addition to recognizing the ethical concerns regarding this potential violation
of the “right not to know,” id., the report also notes that “there are insufficient data on clinical utility
to fully support these recommendations” and calls for ongoing updates thereto. Id. at 3. Though
imperfect, this sort of analysis can be useful in developing and improving the approach to incidental
findings in the research setting.
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informing a subject of a genetic abnormality that either has unclear
health implications or lacks any available treatment could cause
32
significant psychological distress. Returning ambiguous genetic findings,
especially outside of the clinical setting, may cause unnecessary alarm, in
some cases leaving the individual worse off than if she had been told
33
nothing. Nonetheless, although it is “impossible to anticipate everything
that might be discovered,” as the scientific community’s understanding of
genetics improves, it will be possible to more readily distinguish between
34
serious diseases and minor genetic risks. Researchers should therefore
be prepared to consider these distinctions and plan how they will make
these determinations.
C. Biobanks
The practice of biobanking further complicates the problem of
returning the results of genetic research. Biobanks establish an
infrastructure upon which genetic researchers can conduct unspecified
35
future research. They gather and warehouse blood samples either by
36
37
donation or, in some cases, by collection of discarded clinical samples.
By receiving, storing, and providing biological materials, biobanks
furnish researchers with a supply of genetic information that they can use

32. Keane, supra note 20, at 353. It is common for individuals who are at risk for certain chronic
illnesses to forego predictive testing due to the psychological implications of knowing that one is living
with an incurable disease. See, e.g., Biesecker et al., supra note 11 (breast cancer); Quaid & Morris,
supra note 11 (Huntington’s disease); Roberts et al., supra note 6 (Alzheimer’s disease).
33. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 364; see also U.K. Biobank, Ethics and Governance
Framework Version 3.0, at 7 (2007), available at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/ EGF20082.pdf (“[T]he value of such feedback is questionable because the
data would be communicated outside of a clinical setting and would not have been evaluated in the
context of the full medical record. . . . Further, it is not likely to be constructive, and might even be
harmful (including causing undue alarm and having potentially adverse effects on insurance and
employment status), to provide information without prior counseling or support.”).
34. Clayton, supra note 6, at 290. For example, repeated studies of specific genes are likely to give
rise to findings that become more predictable over time and with research experience. Cho, supra note
28, at 282. In contrast, incidental findings are more difficult to anticipate in non-specific, exploratory
genetic research. Id. at 281–82.
35. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615.
36. Individuals sometimes provide materials “specifically for research purposes.” Leslie E. Wolf,
Advancing Research on Stored Biological Materials: Reconciling Law, Ethics, and Practice, 11 Minn.
J.L. Sci. & Tech. 99, 100 (2010). Notably, however, at least one court has found that those who donate
their biological materials have no right to determine how the biobank uses those materials. Id. at 101–
02 (citing Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006)).
37. Id. at 100 (“Stored biological materials come from a variety of sources, such as newborn blood
spots taken for screening purposes [and] blood, tissues, and other materials taken for clinical
diagnostic purposes . . . .”); see D.M. Roden et al., Development of a Large-Scale De-Identified DNA
Biobank to Enable Personalized Medicine, 84 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 362, 362
(2008) (describing the “opt-out” system for amassing discarded, de-identified blood samples initially
collected for clinical purposes at Vanderbilt University Medical Center).
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to conduct broad, population-based studies. Ultimately, the goal of
biobanking is to supply enough biological information so that scientists
can analyze links between genotypes and phenotypes, determine the
causes of common tendencies across a population, and develop tools to
39
apply those results generally to medicine. By design, biobanks aim to
help society rather than individual donors, a structure that encourages
little institutionalized concern for the individual biobank depositor. As a
result, despite the many societal benefits of biobanking, the policies of
biobanks often do not account for individuals’ concerns about accessing
their results.
When they communicate test results, genetic researchers may choose
to give feedback in a variety of ways: initial lab analysis and feedback,
aggregate results from the study, and individual results after the research is
40
completed. Typically, as long as the participant consents to finding out
her results, the initial feedback can be provided to her or her physician
41
immediately at the time of donation to the biobank. But the aggregate
and individual research results of studies on biobanked materials pose a
similar problem to that of incidental findings: It is not feasible to account
for all potential future research at the moment the individual first
contributes her DNA. In determining whether to return these results,
researchers who rely on biobanks for their biological materials must
weigh whether to alert the entire research cohort and risk scaring people
with potential false positives or to re-identify individuals and only
42
present specific participants with their findings. In some cases, it may be
possible to do both by sending an update to all donors about general
findings and then providing individualized information where it is
43
warranted. However, individual follow-up without the guidance of a
genetic counselor can be inadequate and psychologically risky, especially
if the donor made her initial contribution to the biobank in the distant
44
past and does not expect to receive any feedback.
Researchers can use the informed consent process to alleviate some
of the psychological risks of returning unexpected genetic findings. One
solution is to obtain informed consent at the beginning of every study by

38. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615.
39. Roden et al., supra note 37, at 365. Public support is crucial for biobanks, “as it is only with
continued donation of samples and data, and large-scale investment programmes that genomic
research will continue.” Stranger & Kaye, supra note 2, at 2.
40. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615.
41. Id.
42. Kohane et al., supra note 13, at 836.
43. See Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615–16. Many biobanks, for instance, send regular
newsletters to biobank contributors with information about the latest research on their biological
materials. Id.
44. See Clayton, supra note 6, at 286–87.
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45

re-contacting donors and allowing them to opt out. Others argue that
general informed consent to all future research is sufficient and avoids
46
the administrative hurdles involved in re-contacting every donor.
However, if this general informed consent does not fully disclose all of
the actual risks and benefits of contributing genetic information to a
biobank—namely, those associated with having one’s materials used in
unspecified studies and finding out (or not finding out) the results—it
may, like in the case of the Havasupai Tribe, not truly reflect the
47
participants’ choices and thus invalidate their consent. Because the
protocols for future research projects have not yet been designed, a donor
cannot fully understand the benefits and risks of agreeing to take part in
48
subsequent studies at the time of donation. Thus, if the informed consent
process is not carefully designed and reviewed, it may leave unresolved
many of the psychological risks that go along with returning results to
biobank contributors.
Further complicating the problem of returning results is the deidentification of biological materials stored in biobanks. Biological
materials are typically stripped of the donor’s identifying information
and stored with a code that can connect the material back to her in the
future. “The value of the biobank,” after all, “is largely contingent upon
being able to link the samples with donor information and its value
49
increases with the depth and quality of the information.” Although it
may prove difficult to return results where the data are de-identified and
stored over a long period of time (largely due to the associated
50
administrative barriers), a significant number of people are comfortable
with researchers using their de-identified genetic information so long as
they are notified in advance and are given the opportunity to consent or
51
refuse. Proponents argue that this kind of advance-consent procedure
could benefit society immensely. Such a procedure could increase
donations of materials to the biobank and thereby allow the study of
many different phenotype-allele connections without creating any

45. Id.
46. See Lukas Gundermann & Ulrich Stockter, Co-Determination of Donors in Biobanks, in
Principles and Practice in Biobank Governancem, supra note 2, at 69, 71 (“[T]he general need for
explicit informed consent can be abandoned if a substantial public interest so requires. . . . It also
justifies a reduced standard of informed consent, for example, allowing for a one-time broad consent
plus additional elements that safeguard autonomy.”).
47. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. This may undermine not only the participants’
rights but also the development of the biobank and the research conducted on the materials stored in it.
48. Clayton, supra note 6, at 287.
49. Stranger & Kaye, supra note 2, at 2.
50. Fullerton et al., supra note 3, at 429.
51. Roden et al., supra note 37, at 363. In response to a survey of clinical research patients, 90% were
“comfortable with the idea of anonymized genetic information being used for research,” and 5% were
opposed. Id. When given fully informed consent, including a description of the DNA databank, and allowed
to opt out of having their materials included by checking a box, roughly 2.5% of patients did so. Id.
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serious risks of discrimination or breach of privacy due to the anonymity
52
of the data.
In recognition of the ethical and logistic dilemmas that arise from the
return of individual results, many biobanks explicitly prohibit returning
any such results and inform research participants of this prohibition upon
53
the initial submission of their biological materials. For instance,
CARTaGENE, the Université de Montréal’s biobank, specifies that “[n]o
results from future research projects using data or samples will be
54
communicated to participants.” Other institutions take the same
approach but recognize caveats under which they will disclose information
if it is reasonably clear that the benefits of doing so outweigh any risks to
55
the individuals or their families.
Although many biobanks are already considering how different
factors affect their decisions about returning research results to individuals,
there is no standardized way that they make this determination. To create
a clear set of rules upon which researchers and potential donors may rely,
it is necessary to consider how established ethical principles and legal
regimes prescribe the treatment of these kinds of problems. The following
two Parts examine the relevant ethical and legal foundations, respectively,
in which such rules may be grounded.

II. Ethical Foundations
Reflected in national and international guidelines, as well as our
understanding of individual rights, certain ethical principles are
consistently recognized throughout U.S. law and policy. These principles
should shape genetic researchers’ legal obligations to their subjects,
irrespective of the specific legal regime in which those obligations may be
grounded. Because genetic research operates within an emerging and
sparsely developed area of the law, these ethical foundations provide
crucial guidance in developing appropriate and principled duties. This
Part describes the origins of these ethical standards.
A. National Principles
In the late 1970s, the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research delineated a set
56
of ethical principles for human subjects research in the Belmont Report.

52. Id. at 365.
53. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 616–17.
54. CARTaGENE, Université de Montréal, Information Brochure for Participants 10.
55. See, e.g., ALSPAC Ethics & Law Comm., Univ. of Bristol, Policy Guidance Regarding
Divulging Biomedical Information to Participants (2010).
56. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1979) [hereinafter The Belmont
Report], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/belmont.html. The 1974 signing of the National
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The Belmont Report is simply a policy statement, but it lays out the basic
ethical guidelines for human subjects research and prescribes how those
57
principles should be applied.
The Belmont Report sets out two general rules that should underlie
all research: “(1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits and
58
minimize possible harms.” These rules are at the core of the Belmont
Report’s discussion of how to deal with returning research results:
In all cases of research involving incomplete disclosure, such research
is justified only if it is clear that (1) incomplete disclosure is truly
necessary to accomplish the goals of the research, (2) there are no
undisclosed risks to subjects that are more than minimal, and (3) there
is an adequate plan for debriefing subjects, when appropriate, and for
59
dissemination of research results to them.

Though written years before genetic research was commonplace,
this language implies that researchers are obliged to provide their human
research subjects with fully informed consent and to decide in advance
how they will deal with returning genetic research results. At the same
time, it recognizes that disclosure may be limited if it would impede the
60
aims of the research. Part IV discusses these conclusions in greater detail,
but it is clear that the Belmont Report contemplates some measure of
ethical duty for researchers to report results.
B. International Principles
In addition to recognizing the importance of protecting human
research subjects at a national level, the United States has signed on to
globally recognized declarations asserting and preserving the right to
human dignity in research. The Nuremberg Code, drafted in the wake of
horrific and tragic human experimentation during World War II, asserts
61
ten principles of human subjects research. The Nuremberg Code
specifies that research on humans must “avoid all unnecessary physical
62
and mental suffering and injury,” which suggests that the psychological
health of human research subjects should be a primary concern when
researchers are crafting a protocol for returning results.
Building upon the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki
announced the World Medical Association’s Ethical Principles for Medical

Research Act created this commission and charged it with developing ethical guidelines to underline
research on human subjects. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at B.2.
59. Id. at C.1 (emphasis omitted).
60. See infra Part IV.
61. Nuremberg Code: Directives for Human Experimentation, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 181–82 (1949), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html.
62. Id. at no. 4.
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63

Research Involving Human Subjects. The Declaration of Helsinki, first
adopted in 1964 and amended several times since, proclaims that “the wellbeing of the individual research subject must take precedence over all
64
other interests.” The World Medical Association thus placed an
affirmative, global priority on protecting human research subjects—even if
at the expense of scientific discovery—and informed the researcher that
she should always place her subjects’ well-being above the success of her
research.
These treaties, however, do not address and did not contemplate the
intricacies of genetic research. Where it is unclear whether returning or
not returning results will be more problematic, and where results may
only be marginally useful to a subject as compared to the burden on the
researcher, the treaties do not give a clear ethical answer. Rather, the
researcher must weigh the specifics of the situation to decide what is in
the best interest of her subjects.
C. Right to Personal Information
Aside from formal declarations of the rights of human subjects,
human beings have an interest in accessing their own personal health
65
information. Although courts have held that an individual does not
66
have a right of ownership in her cells, the same logic does not apply to
one’s personal genetic information that may have potential health or
67
reproductive consequences. For example, Congress recognized the right
to one’s health information when it passed the Health Insurance
68
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). HIPAA gives individuals
a right to access their personal health information, but in order to exercise
69
that right, one must actively request the information. The obvious
problem in applying HIPAA’s logic to genetic research results is that,
where the results indicate the presence of a disease that may not be
physically apparent, the individual may not have any idea what results
exist about her and therefore cannot know to ask for them. Thus, imposing
an affirmative duty on researchers to report results seems to be the only
way to truly give individuals the informational access that they deserve.
If applied too broadly, however, this proprietary interest could be
problematic. A right to all genetic information could impose on

63. World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving
Human Subjects (2008), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3.
64. Id. at no. 6.
65. See Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 372.
66. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990).
67. See Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 372.
68. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996).
69. Id. § 1175; see Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 365.
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researchers an enormous burden to look for information that is entirely
beyond the aims of the study, which could undermine their research
70
efforts. But if information relevant to a subject’s health is discovered in
the ordinary course of research, there is a strong ethical argument that
the individual is entitled to that information because providing access to
personal information would not impose a substantial burden on the
researcher.
D. Therapeutic Misconception
The therapeutic misconception is another ground that supports an
ethical duty to report results. When dealing with cases about human
subjects research, courts have relied on this theory to support their
71
findings of legal duties. The therapeutic misconception arises out of the
trust that research participants place in the researcher and reflects a
belief that participation in the research will provide them with a clinical
72
benefit. Even if a subject purports to understand that there is no clinical
relationship, her decision to permit the researcher to study her DNA
may lead to an erroneous belief that any and all clinical results will be
73
returned.
For example, when one woman who had been diagnosed with breast
cancer encouraged her two sisters to take part in a university research
study on the hereditary breast cancer gene BRCA1, they were told that
their results were inconclusive, “received no regular status updates and,
74
when [they] called . . . , [their] inquiries were met with annoyance.”
After three years of uncertainty, never knowing if or when the
researchers would contact them, the woman’s two sisters both underwent
preventative mastectomies—only to find out later that they did not have

70. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 376.
71. See infra notes 102–112 and accompanying text.
72. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 365–66. The therapeutic misconception was first identified during
a psychiatric study in which it became clear that many of the subjects, despite having been told that
their treatments were randomized, believed that they were assigned to the treatments that were best
for their individual problems. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed
Consent in Psychiatric Research, 5 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 319, 319–23 (1982).
73. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 365–66. In fMRI studies, for example, despite the lack of any
physician-patient relationship, researchers have a general responsibility to do a diagnostic reading and
follow up on any questionable results, largely in recognition of the participants’ reliance interests. Id.
However, even when there is no such responsibility, it can be difficult for participants to understand
the meaning of complicated informed consent documents, especially if, as is often true of individuals
who are suffering from a serious illness, they are prone to “filter information [out] of their own sense
of desperation.” Lisa M. Arkin et al., Confronting the Issues of Therapeutic Misconception, Enrollment
Decisions, and Personal Motives in Genetic Medicine-Based Clinical Research Studies for Fatal
Disorders, 16 Hum. Gene Therapy 1028, 1029 (2005).
74. Rebecca Fisher, A Closer Look Revisited: Are We Subjects or Are We Donors?, 14 Genetics
Med. 458, 458 (2012).
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the breast cancer gene and that the surgeries had been unnecessary.
Although the sisters expected their participation “to deliver actionable
results specifically to [them],” the researchers viewed them “as only one
76
set of data points among many.” As a result, the three sisters came away
from the experience feeling a “profound sense of betrayal” and lost
77
confidence in the medical profession. Even though the sisters had
participated in the research to contribute to the growth of knowledge
about the BRCA1 allele and seemed to understand the study’s
population-based goals, they nonetheless felt entitled to some level of
78
clinical care with regard to their genetic information.
Because a research participant’s reliance interest can be significant,
informed consent material may not be sufficient to clearly establish the
79
researcher’s responsibilities and manage participants’ expectations. It is
human nature to rely on a person of greater knowledge and access to
one’s health information and to expect disclosure if that information has
negative implications. While a researcher may view the individual’s
results as nothing more than a data point, to the participant they are
infinitely more personal and meaningful. Consequently, even if an
informed consent document specifies that participants should not expect
to get any individual results back, a practical perspective with a focus on
the social values of fairness and reciprocity suggests that they should be
entitled to something more consistent and thorough than what they
currently receive.
If not done carefully, however, returning results may further
encourage the therapeutic misconception by familiarizing research
participants with the notion that researchers will provide them with all
clinically relevant genetic information, whether related to the study or
80
not. In reaction to this concern, some biobanks have already made
efforts to limit their liability by including procedures about how to
provide individual feedback and what caveats to include in order to keep
research subjects from thinking that “the assessment is equivalent to a
81
medical check-up.” Otherwise, an individual subject might misinterpret
the goal of the research and where the project’s priorities lie—that is, in
the population rather than the individual. The potential for
misunderstanding makes it imperative that any legal duty to report

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 364. It is for this reason that many researchers expressly include a
notice at the informed consent stage that they will not return any results. Id. In addition, because of
the unclear guidance as to how much information to share, there remains the constant possibility of
causing emotional distress by reporting too much. Id.
81. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 615.
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results be narrowly drawn so as not to place a burden on researchers that
will only undermine the research it aims to promote.

III. Sources of Legal Duty
While no single U.S. law delineates researchers’ duties to return
genetic results, there exists a strong legal background from which it is
possible to develop appropriate duties. U.S. regulations and common law
alike support some measure of a legal duty owed by researchers to their
subjects. By examining the established jurisprudence as it relates to
genetic researchers—together with the ethical principles described in
Part II—it becomes possible to determine what types of legal obligations
are feasible extensions of existing law.
A. Regulatory Law: The Common Rule
The U.S. Federal Policy on the Protection of Human Subjects—
known as the Common Rule—establishes the protection of human
82
subjects as a national priority. Numerous federal agencies, including the
83
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), have codified the
84
Common Rule in their regulations. The Basic HHS Policy for
Protection of Human Research Subjects mandates that IRBs approve
85
human subjects research only if the participants’ risks are minimized
and “reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects,
and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected
86
to result.” It also requires an informed consent process characterized by
a clear description of risks, benefits, and alternatives, as well as
information about whom to contact if the subject has questions and an
acknowledgement of the right to refuse or discontinue one’s
87
participation in the research. “[W]hen appropriate,” the IRB may
provide additional informed consent elements, including an agreement
that the participant has a right to receive any future significant findings
88
resulting from her participation in the research. In addition, the HHS

82. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last visited July 30, 2013).
83. See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.100–.124 (2009).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 46.111(a)(1). Risks are minimized when the protocol uses procedures that are
“consistent with sound research design” and, if possible, are already being used “for diagnostic or
treatment purposes.” Id.
86. Id. § 46.111(a)(2). “The IRB,” however, “should not consider possible long-range effects of
applying knowledge gained in the research (for example, the possible effects of the research on public
policy) as among those research risks that fall within the purview of its responsibility.” Id.
87. Id. § 46.116(a).
88. Id. § 46.116(b).
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Policy provides that a participant cannot waive any of her legal rights or
89
release the researcher or institution from liability for negligence.
Despite this powerful regulatory language, which recognizes an
individual subject’s right to protect herself when taking part in human
subjects research, the Common Rule does not encompass a private cause
90
of action, and no court to date has recognized such a right. Consequently,
an individual who suffers harm as a result of a genetic researcher’s
negligence in either returning or failing to return her results must find a
cause of action beyond the Common Rule if she is to receive any courtsanctioned remedy for her injury.
B. Common Law: Special Relationship
At common law, researchers’ duties to the participants in their
91
studies have traditionally been limited. Unlike in the medical context, in
a non-clinical research setting there is no physician-patient relationship
that easily establishes a duty to the research participant. Without such a
duty, there is no legal requirement that the researcher take any
affirmative steps to report results to a participant, so it is necessary to
understand the extent to which the common law supports a duty from
researcher to subject. While there may be other ways to establish these
duties, this Subpart describes in detail the obligations that arise out of
the special relationship between the researcher and the participant.
When a physician conducts research in a clinical setting, the common
law imposes certain duties on the patient based on the physician-patient
92
relationship. Those same duties, however, do not necessarily apply where
93
a researcher lacks a therapeutic relationship with the participant. A duty
that goes too far in a purely research context could chill socially beneficial
research and allow subjects control over the direction of research in which
94
they are not otherwise invested.
Despite these concerns, and despite the limited case law dealing
with researcher-participant disputes, one court has found that, under the
89. Id. § 46.116.
90. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 368.
91. See generally Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of
Medical Researchers: An Ethical Framework for Thinking About the Clinical Care that Researchers
Owe Their Subjects, 34 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 25 (2004) (describing the relationship between a researcher
and her subject as creating a duty less than what a physician owes her patient but greater than the
bounds of the research protocol).
92. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a
physician has a duty to disclose personal, non-health-related interests that may materially affect her
medical judgment).
93. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla.
2003) (declining to extend the duty to disclose economic interests where a researcher is not in a
therapeutic relationship with the patient). The court in Greenberg found that Moore was “clearly
distinguishable” because of this lack of clinical dependence. Id.
94. Id. at 1070–71.
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right circumstances, a researcher may have a legal duty to report
95
individual results to participants in her research. Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Institute involved a study on lead paint abatement in which
investigators collected blood samples from children and dust samples
from their homes in order to compare the changing levels of lead over a
96
two-year period. Although the protocol did not contain any affirmative
requirement that the research institute report results to the study
participants, the parents were dismayed to discover that the researchers
had not disclosed evidence that their children’s blood samples indicated
97
they were suffering from lead poisoning. The court sided with the
parents, holding that even when a clinical relationship is lacking, a
special relationship can exist between a researcher and her subject that is
98
sufficient to give rise to a duty to report individual results. Whether
such a relationship exists, the court noted, is a question of fact to be
99
made on a case-by-case basis.
Although the study in Grimes represents a somewhat different
situation from genetic testing, the court’s analysis provides useful insight
into the kinds of relationships that can trigger a duty of care. Notably,
because the risk in Grimes was environmental rather than genetic, had
the subjects been warned of the lead poisoning, it would have been
100
possible for them to escape their peril by moving elsewhere. In
addition, the researchers in Grimes encouraged many of the families in
101
the study to live in homes where there was a known likelihood of risk.
In genetic testing, on the other hand, the results are often much less clear
and the solutions less straightforward. Nonetheless, the relationships
between researchers and subjects in both cases are analogous, so the
analysis of the relationship in Grimes provides a worthwhile comparison.
The Grimes court relied on two underlying theories to justify its
result: the misalignment of interests between researchers and subjects
102
and the knowledge gap between the two parties. Medical researchers,
like physicians, have information about their subjects that the subjects
likely do not know. Unlike physicians, however, researchers respond to
95. See generally Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
96. Id. at 822.
97. Id. at 824–29.
98. Id. at 846. The court also described the relationship as arising from the contractual agreement
between the parties, which is a viable legal avenue but is outside the scope of this Subpart. See id. at 843–44.
99. Id. at 858 (“[U]nder certain circumstances, such research agreements can, as a matter of law,
constitute “special relationships” giving rise to duties, out of the breach of which negligence actions may
arise. We also hold that, normally, such special relationships are created between researchers and the
human subjects used by the researchers. Additionally, we hold that governmental regulations can create
duties on the part of researchers towards human subjects out of which “special relationships” can arise.
Likewise, such duties and relationships are consistent with the provisions of the Nuremberg Code.”).
100. See id. at 812.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 837–51.
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incentives that concern society as a whole rather than individual patients;
103
thus, researchers lack an incentive to disclose individual results.
Although a study may benefit society’s greater good and a researcher
may have only the best intentions, her interests are not aligned with
those of the individual research participant, who “stands to gain nothing
104
and lose everything, including his or her right of self-determination.”
Likewise, when researchers know more about the participants’ health
than the participants themselves do, the participants “cannot and should
105
not be solely responsible for their own protection.” Rather, where the
information and interests are so misaligned as they are in cases like Grimes,
the nature of the relationship between the two demands that the researcher
106
be legally obligated to act in the participant’s best interest. In genetic
research, the gap between what researchers and their subjects know is
often even greater because genetic information can be uniquely difficult
for laypersons to assess—a fact that strengthens Grimes’ reasoning were it
to be applied in a similar case in the context of genetic research.
The Grimes court also noted that IRB approval of an informed
107
consent protocol cannot extinguish a researcher’s legal duty, which
makes it crucial to understand prior to a study exactly what duties
researchers owe human subjects. Particularly when genetic information is
involved, some commentators view the informed consent process itself—
and the consequent entrusting of one’s rights in another person—as the
108
crux of the broader rule that the Grimes court articulated. “Having
gotten the participants to waive their rights against such access to private
aspects of their bodies,” they argue, “the researchers obtain special
responsibilities to look after the fundamental values that those rights
109
normally protect.” That is, when a subject provides a researcher access
into the privacy of her body and medical history, the researcher must
take over the responsibility of dealing with any threats revealed in the
110
This partial
course of exercising that privileged information.

103. Id. at 838.
104. Id. at 837 (quoting Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject
Experimentation, 19 J. Legal Med. 157 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Havasupai
Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066–67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing the inherent
misunderstanding between researchers, who saw their research as beneficial for all of society, and their
subjects, who were nonetheless morally and religiously opposed to further research).
105. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 851 (quoting Nat’l Bioethics Advisory Comm’n, Ethical and Policy
Issues in Research Involving Human Participants 3–4 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 850–51 (“The duty to a vulnerable research subject is independent of consent, although
the obtaining of consent is one of the duties a researcher must perform.”).
108. See Henry S. Richardson & Mildred K. Cho, Secondary Researchers’ Duties to Return
Incidental Findings and Individual Research Results: A Partial-Entrustment Account, 14 Genetics
Med. 467, 470 (2012).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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entrustment theory, rather than focusing on ethical values like respect
and reciprocity that may not as readily attach in the case of secondary
111
research and biobanks, emphasizes that a duty arises the moment an
individual puts her trust in somebody else who is prepared to accept that
112
commitment. Under this logic, it may not even be necessary that the
research participant ever meet the researcher, much less form a personal
bond, only that she establish a special relationship by entrusting the
researcher with her DNA and ensuring that the researcher accept that
responsibility.
Establishing a special relationship may also give rise to a duty to
warn. A duty to warn may arise if an individual has information that, if
113
disclosed, can help avoid a serious, foreseeable harm. In the context of
research, such a duty may exist if there is “unequal knowledge and the
defendant possessed of such knowledge, knows or should know that
114
harm might occur if no warning is given.” Courts in duty to warn cases
focus on the notion that one person should not withhold information
from another when that information could protect the second individual
115
from serious harm and when there is no significant cost to share it. For
instance, if a researcher gets samples from a biobank and discovers that
an individual research subject has a high chance of developing a deadly
illness that can be prevented if treated early, the holder of the
information (the researcher) faces little burden in warning the
participant of a preventable disease that otherwise might kill her. In such
116
a case, although some critics argue otherwise, there need not be any
111. See id. at 468–69.
112. See id. at 470.
113. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344–45 (Cal. 1976).
114. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 370 (quoting Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d
803, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Blaz v. Michael Reese Hospital
Foundation, the court denied the defendant physician’s motion to dismiss when a former patient who
had undergone radiation therapy as a child sued, arguing that the physician failed to adequately
disclose the results of his subsequent research and warn the plaintiff of the risks of developing neural
tumors. 74 F. Supp. 2d at 804, 807. The court cited four criteria established by the Illinois Supreme
Court as those giving rise to a duty to warn: (1) the foreseeability of the harm, (2) the likelihood of the
injury, (3) the weight of the burden of warning the plaintiff, and (4) the effect of that burden on the
defendant. Id. at 805. Blaz, however, differs from the genetic research setting because the physician in
that case directly caused the physical risk to the patient, rather than simply discovering a preexisting
risk, making the consequences of placing the burden of warning the plaintiff different in the two
scenarios. See id. at 806.
115. Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 371.
116. See Loane Skene, Feeding Back Significant Findings to Participants and Relatives, in
Principles and Practice in Biobank Governance, supra note 2, at 161, 169. Critics also suggest that
there is a causation problem inherent in this argument because the researcher does not actually cause
the harm—that is, the genetic disorder—to the participant. Id. However, applying the loss of chance
doctrine is helpful in these cases in allowing us to think of the harm suffered as the loss of a chance to
get early, appropriate medical care. See Wolf et al., supra note 18, at 371; see also Herskovits v. Grp.
Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476 (Wash. 1983) (“Some courts . . . have allowed the
proximate cause issue [of whether a defendant increased the decedent’s risk of death by decreasing the
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direct relationship between the researcher and the subject for the duty to
117
apply because it depends not on a relationship but rather on the
118
balance of the burden on one individual against the benefit to another.
The existing U.S. legal regimes reflect a recognition that participants
in medical and genetic research deserve something more than simply
knowing that they are a part of a socially beneficial study (and maybe a
nominal stipend). Rather, as Grimes suggests, researchers should have a
duty to offer feedback to their subjects when the information they can
119
provide is of significant personal and medical value. Conversely, when
certain genetic information is determined to be less valuable to
individuals, the duty should not extend so far as to interfere with
120
researchers’ other responsibilities. Delineating the boundary between
the risks that must be disclosed and those that the researcher may keep
to herself is crucial to avoid flooding researchers with responsibilities
that might distract them from their research. Therefore, it is essential to
thoroughly analyze how different factors, in isolation or in conjunction
with others, affect the value of the genetic information in question and
impact the decision whether to return it. The next Part discusses this
balancing in depth.

IV. Recommendations
Taking into consideration the infrastructure in which genetic
researchers operate and the relevant ethical and legal foundations, this
Article proposes that researchers should have three specific duties when
dealing with the return of genetic research results: (1) to plan for the
management of incidental findings, (2) to obtain fully informed consent
as to the return of results, and (3) to offer to disclose a limited subset of
chance of survival] to go to the jury on this type of proof. These courts emphasized the fact that
defendants’ conduct deprived the decedents of a ‘significant’ chance to survive or recover, rather than
requiring proof that with absolute certainty the defendants’ conduct caused the physical injury. The
underlying reason is that it is not for the wrongdoer, who put the possibility of recovery beyond
realization, to say afterward that the result was inevitable.” (citations omitted)).
117. Cf. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a doctor’s duty to warn relatives
of her patient’s genetically transferable condition could be discharged by warning the patient herself).
118. See Richardson & Cho, supra note 108, at 468.
119. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 834 (Md. 2001). For example, in the
case of treatable genetic disorders that are indicated by a single gene, the availability of immediate
clinical solutions can vastly increase the potential benefits of disclosure to the subject. Pullman &
Hodgkinson, supra note 5, at 200, 202.
120. This determination should be based on an objective reasonable person standard—that is, by
asking what information would be material to a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff,
taking into account the factors described in Part IV.C, infra. In the medical context, using an objective
standard of materiality to determine what risks must be disclosed for informed consent can provide
increased predictability for physicians in medical malpractice proceedings. See Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772, 787–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The objective standard, able to vary based on a defined set of
conditions, can be expected to provide similarly predictable measures of liability to genetic
researchers.
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clinically actionable results. With these duties in place, researchers would
have greater responsibility than they do under their present legal
obligations, but clearly defining those responsibilities would allow
researchers to understand and prepare for them in advance. Likewise,
potential research participants would be able to rely on the consistent
expectation and enforcement of these three duties.
To best ensure dependability and uniformity, these duties must
apply to all genetic studies, regardless of whether the institution is large
or small, or whether the materials are taken directly from an individual
or from the shelf of a biobank. Much of the literature on the return of
results isolates this problem into a single setting (for example, treating
primary and secondary research as wholly distinct issues) rather than
121
viewing it from a broader perspective. But in order for potential
participants to have a full understanding of their rights and for
researchers to know exactly what they are obligated to do, both of which
are imperative to prevent chilling the progress of genetic research, all
genetic studies should be viewed under one cohesive model. Thus, rather
than isolating results by context alone, the context of the study should be
only one of several considerations in the determination of a researcher’s
duty.
A. Management of Incidental Findings
To get IRB approval, research protocols should be required to
include a plan for management of incidental findings. Requiring research
designers to consider what kinds of incidental findings they might find
and how they would deal with them in advance would better ensure that
they keep their subjects’ interests in mind throughout the research
process. This management duty arises in part from the ethical principles
122
described in the Belmont Report, which requires “an adequate plan for
debriefing subjects, when appropriate, and for dissemination of research
123
results to them.” It also stems directly from the Common Rule, which
codifies the need for an IRB to ensure suitable protections in every study
124
that involves human subjects. Though the minor details of the specific
management plans could be left to the judgment of individual researchers
or biobanks, research institutions would, at a minimum, need to consider
what types of findings would be most likely to arise and decide how and
under what circumstances they would disclose those findings.
Under federal oversight by the HHS, this condition would help
achieve national uniformity in the field of genetic research by requiring a
121. See, e.g., Laura M. Beskow & Wylie Burke, Offering Individual Genetic Research Results:
Context Matters, 38 Sci. Translational Med. 20 (2010).
122. See supra Part II.A.
123. The Belmont Report, supra note 56, at C.1.
124. See supra Part III.A.
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consistent level of consideration of the issue of returning results, without
imposing overly restrictive constraints that could limit the field’s
development. This, in turn, would help standardize what types of results
would be returned and thereby allow greater reliance by individuals who
would better understand what to expect from participating in genetic
research studies. In addition, asking study designers to think about the
implications of incidental findings ahead of time would not only ensure
appropriate administrative procedures, but would also make researchers
more alert to the possibility that they might discover information that
could be relevant to a subject’s health. This increase in understanding
and awareness would alleviate some of the misalignment of interests
125
about which the Grimes court was concerned. If researchers’ protocols
explicitly required them to recognize their subjects’ interests, they would
not only consider the societal impact of the study, but would also be
required to keep in mind the individual participants’ interests throughout
the research process.
Notably, the duty described in this Subpart should be limited only to
requiring a management plan. Neither federal nor state governments
should require researchers to actively seek out incidental findings, as that
could seriously impede the progress of research by distracting
investigators from their primary purpose. Likewise, biobanks should—
within the existing guidelines and those proposed herein—make their
own decisions about the precise guidelines that they will uphold with
126
respect to return of results, as several already have, because they are
most familiar with their own operations. With the advent of a legal duty
to enforce those standards, biobanks could continue to develop their
policies and even look to other biobanks to see what procedures are most
effective, in order to work toward industry-wide best practices. For
instance, if biobanks were required to report their plans at a federal
level, researchers across the country could consider and integrate others’
policies into their own governance. This shared knowledge would benefit
all genetic studies, whether they use biobanked or individually collected
materials, and allow participants to rely on researchers to have a welltested strategy to deal with incidental findings.
B. Fully Informed Consent
As a part of their duties to provide informed consent, researchers
should be required to fully describe and discuss the risks and benefits of
knowing certain types of genetic information, in addition to the physical
risks of the study. Participants should then be able to opt out of receiving
results. Once planned for in their research protocols, this requirement

125. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 837–38 (Md. 2001).
126. See ALSPAC Ethics & Law Comm., supra note 55.
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would not impose any significant burden on researchers. Nor is the
requirement of fully informed consent controversial; it arises out of
127
128
129
regulatory, common law, and ethical principles alike.
In a biobank setting, the researcher should also be made aware of the
informed consent requirements so that she understands her responsibilities
130
with regard to the participants’ rights. Because it is often difficult to
track down individuals at the start of each study, contributors to
biobanks could agree in advance to have their materials used in specific
types of studies, which they could indicate on an intake form—for
instance, by marking assent to cancer studies but not to mental health
studies. When a study diverges significantly from the types described in
the initial intake form, re-contact would be necessary to procure additional
consent. Viewing the informed consent process as one in which the
subjects entrust their privacy rights in their DNA to the researchers, this
process would cement the researchers’ obligation to protect those rights
131
while streamlining the research process as much as possible.
The heightened informed consent requirement arises from legal and
ethical foundations and would provide several benefits to research
participants. Based on both the regulations in the Common Rule and the
132
special relationship between researchers and subjects, it would help
alleviate the problem of therapeutic misconception. By clarifying the
precise nature of the research, full informed consent would ensure that
participants understand exactly what they are agreeing to when deciding
whether to be informed of certain types of results. Furthermore, a full
explanation of what one could expect by donating genetic material to a
study that would provide no subsequent feedback would provide crucial
respect for individual autonomy. The requirement of an opt-out
provision would ensure that participants who decide they do not want to
know certain kinds of results are able to exercise that choice.
The duty of fully informed consent should aim to set a standard for
communication between researchers and participants, even if that means
that some individuals are dissuaded from participating in genetic
research by what they learn during the informed consent process. Over
time, standardized researcher-subject communication would help
develop a sense of trust in the system that would ultimately strengthen
133
public support for genetic research. Because all parties involved stand
127. See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2009).
128. See, e.g., Grimes, 782 A.2d at 850–51.
129. See, e.g., The Belmont Report, supra note 56, at C.1.
130. See Richardson & Cho, supra note 108, at 471.
131. Id. at 469.
132. See supra notes 127–128.
133. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale
Genomic Biobanks, 8 Ann. Rev. Genomics & Hum. Genetics 343, 344 (2007) (“[B]y failing to respect
donors, the biobanks put at risk the long-term interests of biomedical science, which can only prosper
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to benefit from the enforcement of fully informed consent as to the
return of genetic research results, it should be a priority in framing a set
of responsibilities.
C. Disclosure of Limited Clinically Actionable Results
Finally, researchers should have a legal duty to offer to disclose
certain results that present a serious and foreseeable harm and to have a
plan for referral to genetic counseling. Like having a management plan,
this would ensure both procedural protections for and thoughtful
consideration of the possibility of actionable results before a study
begins. By requiring only that researchers offer to disclose their findings,
this duty would respect the participants’ rights to know their personal
information and, alternatively, to exercise personal autonomy should
they not want to know. Stemming in large part from the special
relationship between genetic researchers and their human subjects, this
duty to warn would require that a researcher disclose genetic information
if that information could help a participant avoid a serious and
134
foreseeable harm. To narrow the reach of the duty, it is critical to
determine what types of genetic results would constitute such harm.
A starting point is that results should only be returned when they
are “clinically actionable”—that is, when they have the “potential to
135
change immediate medical care.” It is not sufficient, however, that a
finding be medically related, because the burden on the researcher to
disclose all potential medical risks would be overwhelming. Several
variables interplay in the judgment of which clinically actionable results
must be disclosed, most importantly the severity of the disease (that is,
the finding’s potential impact on health or reproductive decisionmaking),
the probability of actually developing the disease, and the availability
and effectiveness of treatment. The greater the degree to which these
factors are present, the more likely it should be that the researcher has a
duty to inform the subject of the genetic finding.
Depending on the extent of the severity, probability, and treatability,
weighing these factors can split results into multiple categories of clinical
actionability: results that must be returned, results that may be returned at
136
the researcher’s discretion, and results that may never be returned. For
example, the discovery of a genetic predisposition to a severe or lifethreatening disease that is highly likely to materialize and for which

with the trust and support of the population.”).
134. See supra notes 113–115 and accompanying text.
135. Fullerton et al., supra note 3, at 425.
136. See Wolf et al., supra note 25, at 235 tbl.5. Wolf describes the three categories as those in
which disclosing results has a “Strong Net Benefit,” a “Possible Net Benefit,” or an “Unlikely Net
Benefit.” Id.
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treatment is available would always need to be reported. On the other
hand, a result that does not by itself carry any health implications, such as
138
misattributed paternity, would not require disclosure.
The degree of clinical actionability alone, however, does not clarify
what researchers should be required to disclose when a finding falls in
the middle of this spectrum. In making determinations about which of
these results to share, researchers must consider additional factors,
139
especially when those factors have powerful ethical implications. These
factors should include the extent to which the subject relies on the
researcher for getting care and whether the subject is particularly
140
vulnerable. The possible negative consequences that the participant
faces as a result of her participation in the research—for instance, the
potential that her genetic information could be used for discriminatory
purposes if her DNA makeup were to be exposed—should also be
141
considered. When de-identified information is easily re-linked to
subjects, it should be imperative, as a matter of fairness and reciprocity,
142
to return information to them because of their increased vulnerability.
Furthermore, the ease of return should play a crucial role. If there is
a minimal burden on the researcher to return the information, as is
generally the case the closer the finding is in time and subject matter to
the initial study, she has a much less compelling reason not to return the
143
results. For instance, if a finding were closely related to the study’s
aims, not only would the burden likely be minimal, but the participant’s
144
reliance on the researcher would also likely be strong. Similarly, in
certain types of studies, such as pedigree studies, researchers may have
long-term relationships with their subjects that facilitate trust and
145
communication. In contrast, researchers who use biobanked materials

137. See id.
138. See id.; see also Cho, supra note 28, at 282 (“[T]he potential benefits of genetic research may
be informational only, rather than directly providing therapeutic value. Nevertheless, consideration of
circumstances in which the information might change clinical decisions, such as the availability of an
effective intervention or prevention, is important.”).
139. Cf. Greely, supra note 133, at 360 (“Regardless of the moral and legal obligations, it would be
extremely unwise for researchers not to disclose such risks. Consider what happens after the first
lawsuit by the bereaved family of a research subject whose life would have been saved had researchers
revealed a risk they discovered. Whether or not the plaintiffs win, those researchers and their
institution will be branded as heartless, interested in subjects only as laboratory animals, and all
biomedical research will feel the fallout.”).
140. See Richardson & Cho, supra note 108, at 469 tbl.1. Vulnerability is measured by asking:
“How much difference would getting the information in question make to the health or welfare of the
participant?” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Cho, supra note 28, at 282–83.
144. See, e.g., Ewen Callaway, Gene Hunt Is on for Mental Disability, 484 Nature 302, 303 (2012).
145. Cho, supra note 28, at 282–83.
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may have no contact with the human subjects themselves, and thus the
146
burden of returning results may be significantly greater.
The balance of these factors should depend on the particulars of the
study and the finding in question. For example, one research project’s
ethical review board struggled to determine whether an incidental
finding of an increased risk of colon cancer must be disclosed when
147
discovered during a study on mental disabilities in children. Although
the board decided to disclose the information in one instance on the
theory that the child patients relied on the researchers for medical
information, researchers in similar studies choose not to disclose such
148
findings. Such a determination could rightly vary between studies due
to the structure of the study and the relationship and reliance between
the researcher and the subject.
Other determinations should be more dependent on the nature of
the disease. For example, one review board determined that a mutation
of a gene that predisposes individuals to deep vein thrombosis and
pulmonary embolisms should be disclosed only when an individual is
homozygous for the mutation because the increase in risk for the disease
only at that point rises to the level at which preventative measures
outweigh the risks of “creating ‘worried well’ individuals among those
149
still unlikely to develop symptoms.” Despite their complicated and
delicate nature, however, the interrelationship of these factors provides a
framework for making these decisions.
Due to their complexity, determinations about precisely which
results should be returned to research participants should be made by
boards consisting of geneticists, policymakers, and others who are
familiar with the impact of different genes and diseases. These
evaluations should evolve over time as treatments become more readily
available, tests improve in their accuracy, and electronic medical records
make it easier to share information about both clinical health and
150
genetics. One promising solution to these challenges would be to
establish ongoing IRB subcommittees that would implement guidelines
for what types of findings researchers should return and act as screening
151
boards to review any results that arise. These subcommittees could also
provide a mechanism for national review by reporting their decisions to a
centralized board, which over time would help develop a uniform

146. See id. at 282.
147. Id. at 282–83.
148. Id.
149. Fullerton et al., supra note 3, at 426.
150. Id. at 428. Increasing access to electronic medical records may help determine whether it is
necessary to provide results: If a person already shows clinical signs of an otherwise actionable result,
for instance, it may be unnecessary to counsel her about her genetic predisposition. Id.
151. See id. at 425.
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national consensus as to which results should be returned. Removing the
responsibility for these kinds of judgment calls from the researcher
would both conserve research resources and ensure appropriate review
by a board that is familiar with the ever-changing clinical and ethical
implications of returning results.
Once the IRB subcommittee has determined that results must be
communicated, researchers would have a duty to refer the participant to
a genetic counselor when the information has implications that the
researcher is unable to communicate to the subject herself. Although
researchers generally hold the most information about the subject’s
genetics, they do not have the clinical training or experience of physicians
and therefore may be ineffective when communicating serious and
152
oftentimes confusing genetic information to a layperson. But simply
suggesting that “donors seek additional help and guidance from physicians
or genetic counselors on the assumption they will do so is shortsighted and
does not take into account the realities of the situation: there is evidence
that many physicians still do not possess sufficient understanding of the
153
Therefore, researchers should be
implications of genetic tests.”
responsible for actively connecting their subjects to genetic counselors
who can thoroughly explain the implications of any findings.
The requirement of referral for genetic counseling should also apply
in the context of biobanking. Some biobanks choose not to engage in
individual feedback at all because of the fear that information disclosed
outside of the clinical setting provides neither a full view of the
154
individual’s medical record nor appropriate counseling. These policies,
however, prevent subjects from learning of even the most important
information. To preserve their right to their personal information, the
duty to refer to a genetic counselor would guarantee that feedback would
be given in an appropriate manner but would not overburden a
researcher who is untrained in and unprepared for providing genetic
information in a clinical setting.

Conclusion
By analyzing and balancing the varying perspectives on returning
genetic research results while keeping in mind relevant practical, ethical,
and legal considerations, this Article has aimed to develop limited,
mutually beneficial duties that better align the interests and incentives of
the involved parties. With so much at stake on all sides of the issue, this
is a crucial point in the development of the laws and policies that impact
the field of genetic research. Establishing the limited duties described in

152. See Fisher, supra note 74, at 459.
153. Id.
154. Zawati & Rioux, supra note 28, at 616; see U.K. Biobank, supra note 33, at 7.
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this Article would clarify subjects’ and researchers’ respective rights and
responsibilities and ensure their ongoing enforcement. These duties
would help shape society’s understanding of the interplay between
science, ethics, and law in a manner that not only promotes ongoing
scientific development, but also protects the people who volunteer their
bodies to make such research possible.

